STORAGE DEVELOPER CONFERENCE

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BY Developers FOR Developers

SSD Firmware Resilience: Approaches and Challenges to Protect Against Emerging Threats

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The New Paradigm of Solid-State Storage

\$8B+ Revenue*

*Solidigm + SK Revenue

3 NAND Factories

Global Organization, HQ in California

- Solid-State Innovation Since 1987
 intel + SK hynix
- Leadership in Enterprise,
 Cloud & Client

Pace-setting innovation across Floating Gate & Charge Trap, TLC & QLC



- Platform Resiliency Overview (as defined by NIST SP800-193)
- Resiliency Architectural Overview (as it relates to storage devices)
- Call to Action



Platform Resiliency Overview





Brief Platform Resilience Taxonomy

- Platform: Comprised of hardware and firmware necessary to boot the system to a point at which software, or an operating system, can be loaded
- Platform Device: Typically contain mutable firmware, and are covered by the intended scope of the security guidelines in SP800-193
- Code: Firmware code is the set of instructions used by any device's processing unit to perform the operations required by the device
- Critical Data (properties):
 - It must be in a valid state for the proper booting and run-time operation of the device;
 - It persists across power cycles (e.g. stored in non-volatile memory)
 - It modifies the behavior or function of the device
 - It must be in a valid state to support protection, detection and/or recovery of platform firmware and associated data.

For this talk: Firmware Resilience refers to firmware of an SSD that must be recoverable



Resilience: Not a New Concept for Storage Devices


Existing Resilience Capabilities*	Description
Multiple Firmware Slots	Drive will automatically attempt to load device mutable code from an alternate slot if current slot fails
Multiple Firmware Copies / slot	Each slot contains redundant copies of Firmware
OCP Error Recovery Mechanisms	Enables Host to recover the device to a known security state
Read Only Mode	Enables the host to evacuate (read) user data when the drive reaches End of Life (EOL)
Telemetry	Drovidee ferencie date for identifying feilures
SMART Data	Provides forensic data for identifying failures

What do you do when NONE of the above mechanisms are successful?

* The number and capability of resilience capabilities may vary across storage vendors




Architectural Components for Resilience





Elements of Firmware Resilience Architecture


- SSD Recovery State
- Interface(s) for Recovery
- Location of Recovery Firmware
- SSD Recovery Capabilities
- Support for Host Initiated Recovery



Some variations in Architectural Elements between Client and Datacenter storage devices




SSD Recovery State






SSD Recovery State



All native resilience capabilities FAILED
 System Metadata MAY be LOST or CORRUPTED
 User data MAY be LOST or CORRUPTED
 GOAL: Recover the <u>Device</u>


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Interface(s) for Recovery






Interface(s) for Recovery





Location of Recovery Firmware






Location of Recovery Firmware

Recovery Firmware

- Fully functional.
- Integrity Protected.
- Updatable at any time.



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
Recovery Interface Code

- Immutable (recommended).
- Automatically run if no bootable Firmware
- Interface commands limited to Recovery

- What if Recovery Interface Code can't be immutable?
 - Designate a Firmware slot to store interface code as "read-only" Firmware
 - "Read Only" firmware may encounter same issues that made recovery necessary




SSD Recovery Capabilities





SSD Recovery Capabilities




Recovery Interface Code

- Automatically runs when no bootable firmware found
- Discovery capabilities, such as...
 - OCP: Secure Boot Failure
 - Not Addressed in any recognized industry
- Standard method interface specifications overvinage
 - (PCIe, DMTF, NVMe, SMBUS, etc.)
 - MAY imply some level of device formatting
 - MAY imply full recovery in a secure manufacturing environment
 - E.g., to restore cryptographic keys

* NIST SP800-193: Critical data is mutable data which persists across power cycles and must be in a valid state for the booting of the platform to securely and correctly proceed.


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Support for Host Initiated Recovery





Host Initiated Recovery



Host Initiated Recovery

Example: Host software detects instability and wants to restore SSD to factory state.

How is Trust established for Host Initiated Recovery?

- Physical Presence examples
 - GPIO
 - VU command with TCG PSID*

* https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-storage-opal-feature-set-psid/



Call to Action

Call to Action

Industry partnership to align on Recovery usage models and functional requirements

• OCP putting a stake in the ground. Broader industry participation encouraged

> Help drive industry interface specification(s) for Recovery

Driven by platform usage models / constraints (e.g., client vs. datacenter platforms)

References	Description
NIST SP800-193 - Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines	Establishes a framework for Protection, Detection and Recovery
OCP Recovery Specification	Industry led specification. Defines a protocol for recovery based on SMBUS. Not yet ratified by OCP
?	Industry Interface Specification(s) that define the interface semantics for Recovery. May require multiple interface definitions to support all variant use cases for Recovery

Thank You!





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